Europe’'s dependence on Chinese goods has grown so structurally in certain sectors that reliable alternatives have virtually disappeared.
The pressure intensified in 2025’te, where Washington’ imposed extensive customs duties on Chinese goods; This raised fears that Beijing ’ would divert excess production to European markets at discounted prices.
Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, at last year's G7 summit in ’, Canada, described it as “, a new Chinese shock, and Beijing warned that ” is flooding global markets with subsidized surplus capacity that its own consumers cannot afford.
Last week, Stéphane Séjourné, AB’'s Commissioner for Industry, called on EU businesses to diversify their suppliers as trade tensions with China escalate as Beijing’in constantly threatens AB’ and Brussels’in seeks to strengthen legislation to protect its markets from dependence on China’.
According to Eurostat’, EU’'s imports from China’ reached a total of 559.4 billion euros in 2025’te; this figure since 2015’ increased, creating a trade deficit of 359.8 billion euros. Only in 2025 AB’'s China’e exports %6.5 Decrease in imports %Increased by 6.4.
China is by far AB’'s largest source of imports and main supplier of dependent products. ’sini exports to the bloc and represents roughly half of the total import value, and 404 billion Euro’ represents about 206 billion Euro’.
Dependent products refer to the parts and raw materials needed to create the final product. For example, the demand for a smartphone battery depends on the number of finished smartphones a company plans to manufacture.
Although the U.S. is the second-largest supplier of AB’-dependent products, according to a recent analysis by the Center for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), published this month, %Less than 10’ and the total import value is only is ’ini.
Combined with other data showing broader strategic dependence, five sectors in which AB’'s exposure to Beijing’ is structural are revealed: solar energy, critical raw materials, industrial robot technology, chemicals, textile and wood products.
In each of these sectors, Euronews compiled an overview of some of the causes of AB’'s extraordinary dependence on China’e.
Green transition made in China’
Of all AB’'s dependencies on Pekin’e, the one buried deep within its green agenda is arguably the most important.
According to Eurostat’, China plans to import all solar panels to AB’ in 2024. ’ini was formed. The total value of these imports decreased from Euro’te 19.7 billion in 2023 to Euro’te 10.9 billion in 2024; This was not because volumes were declining, but because Chinese prices were collapsing.
The exact figures for last year's solar panel imports have not yet been released.
In a report published this year by the think tank Loom also found that China’in, AB’in's imports of lithium-ion batteries for electric vehicles in 2019’in ’inden 2025’te ’ini was provided.
The vulnerability extends far beyond finished products.
Research department of the European Parliament’, AB’'s rare earth magnets, including materials required for electric vehicle motors, wind turbines and defense systems %He found that he supplied 98’ini from China’.
Data from the European Commission’ also show that AB’ has been linked to Beijing ’e dependence on magnesium. %It says it's 97. In addition to being essential for next-generation batteries, which are an alternative to lithium-ion technologies, the mineral is also used for hydrogen storage and light renewable infrastructure.
Due to this overwhelming single-country dependence, the European Commission has placed it on the bloc's Critical Raw Materials list to accelerate domestic extraction, processing and recycling initiatives.
Finally, according to a report from the Geopolitical Intelligence Services, Chinese firms believe that the global solar photovoltaic production capacity from polysilicon production to finished modules %It controls more than 80’.
In short, the European ’'s transition to green is based on foundations that it does not control.
The robot surge
Industrial robot technology tells the story not only of addiction, but also of increased displacement.
According to data published by the European Commission’'s import surveillance task force, from the beginning of 2025’ to the beginning of 2026’'s import of industrial robots from AB’'s China’ %Increased by 315, while average prices is down.
China’'s dominance in this sector is not accidental.
Backed by government subsidies, cheap credit and tax incentives, the “ Made in China 2025” industrial strategy helped the country's advanced robotics sector triple the number of companies registered since 2020’.
Domestic overproduction has pushed Chinese manufacturers to aggressively export at prices that European competitors cannot afford.
According to the International Federation of Robotics, ’, China now produces more industrial robots than Germany, South Korea, Japan and the United States combined.
Chemicals, textiles and wood: old addictions, new depths
In the chemical sector, the European Commission said ’'s surveillance data showed that some chemical compounds were imported at rates 36 times higher than in the year before China’, and that prices %It turned out to be as low as 95’e.
March 2025’te The Commission launched special monitoring for certain ethylene and ammonia-based chemicals, citing production capacity surpluses in China’ and a sharp increase in EU market shares.
Textiles and wood products tell a similar story.
While some of the production has shifted to lower-cost Southeast Asian competitors such as Vietnam, clothing and footwear from China’ still represent a significant portion of AB’'s overseas supply.
According to Eurostat’, China, on the basis of value of the European Union, ’'s total out-of-home clothing and footwear imports are approx. %From 30 to ’ini is provided.
Wood products, China’den assembled parquet flooring imports more than ten times in a single year, prices creased by 77% and commissioned by ’ in July 2025 to protect an industry valued at €1.3 billion, which employs more than 10,000’ people. %with 21.3 %Wood products have become a newer flashpoint as it has led to the imposition of taxes between 36.1 and
Do this to secure more than 2,000’ jobs in Europe’ %with 26.4 %The ’te decor paper followed in August 2025, when taxes were imposed between 26.9 and 2025.
In all five sectors, the Commission's response was largely reactive and tariffs were imposed after the damage occurred.
The deeper question is whether Europe can maintain industrial capacity and political will to build real alternatives before ’'s dependence becomes irreversible and thus Beijing becomes a lever ’ can use freely.
