Iran, in a new attempt to put West’ under economic pressure, raises the idea of implementing ’ access fee“ to undersea internet cables passing through the Strait of Hormuz”; This is a move that could further strain global trade following the blockage of the transition.
The plan was first proposed by Tasnim, an Iranian news agency affiliated with the ’na (IRGC) of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
Questions arose about who exactly should pay such tariffs and what types of services will be targeted.
From a logistical point of view, companies that operate cables under the Strait Iran’a will have to pay a “access fee”, while from a regulatory point of view, tech giants such as Google, Meta, Microsoft and Amazon will have to vaguely follow the rules defined as “Iranian laws.
Third, the Islamic Republic can also undertake cable maintenance in the Strait of Hormuz and charge more accordingly.
the " Movements" can produce itup to 13 billion Euro’ for the country.
From Ege’ to Spain’ya: How does Europe get involved?
According to the Submarine Telecom Forum’, European ’ firms from France, Italy, Greece and the UK own or are part of a management consortium of at least four cables that run under Hormuz.
Two of these cables are particularly important as they connect the Asya’ to the European’.
The first of these is Asia Africa Europe-1 (AAE1)’, whose owners include Italy’'s Retelit and Greece’'s OTEGLOBE’. Crete, Bari and Marseille reach the ’ landing points.
Secondly, PEARLS/2Africa, part of the world's largest undersea cable system, runs under the ’ of Sicily before arriving in Genoa, Marseille and Barcelona’.
How much do wages pose a threat to Europe?
Currently, there is no consensus among experts on the threats posed by Iran’.
Some argue that if the country actually imposes wages, the results will likely extend far beyond telecommunications infrastructure, affecting global trade, maritime law, military strategy, internet governance, and big power policies.
Meredith Primrose Jones, president of geopolitics and risk and compliance consulting firm Leidra’, said: “European finance institutions, cloud providers, telecommunications firms and multinational companies rely heavily on low-latency submarine cable networks for banking operations, digital services, energy trading and industrial operations.”
Any increase in political risk around the Strait of “ could increase connectivity costs, delay infrastructure projects, and create greater vulnerability for Europe’'s digital economy at a time when the region is already focused on strengthening technological resilience and strategic autonomy, ” said.
On the other hand, threats of tariff cuts and even physical sabotage of the cable are greatly underestimated by other experts.
International Cable Protection Committee (IPCC) Europe in Motion’a “Strait of Hormuz onstitutes less than ’, ” said.
The IPCC says the impact will be minimal, even in the event of cable failure, thanks to backup systems connected to the Gulf region.
Many cable systems serving the “ Bay region use branching architectures connected to larger international mainline systems, the committee said. “This network design provides additional operational flexibility and durability and helps minimize the impact of individual cable failures.”
He explained that submarine cable failures were not unusual operational events.
IPCC, “About 150-200 submarine telecommunications cable failures occur each year around the world, and about %The 70-80’i is caused by accidental human activity, such as commercial fishing activity and ship anchors, rather than sabotage, ” said.
Does anyone else charge for submarine cable access?
Iran’'s plan is not unique: Egypt already charges for underwater cable access, which provides significant revenue for the country's Telecom business model.
A Work carried out by submarinenetworks.comIn the period 2000-2019, it is estimated that the cost of landing rights, maintenance and operational support for each underwater cable operator will be approximately 1.5 million euros.
Egypt is described as a global telecommunications transit point due to the large number of cables passing through it.
The most important difference of Hormuz’ is that the cables passing through Mısır’ physically pass through its territory and are connected to its terrestrial infrastructure.
In contrast, most of the cables in Hormuz’ do not enter Iranian territory, which means that Tehran’ will have little legal basis for paid access.
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) protects maritime flows and international navigation in this sense.
Iran signed the agreement in ’ in 1982, but never ratified it.
Jones, “, therefore, said that a unilateral toll system targeting global cable infrastructure would be broadly interpreted as an overuse of coastal state authority under UNCLOS principles.
